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This paper analyses whether interest rate paths in the EMU member countries would have 
been different if the previous national central banks had not handed over monetary policy to 
the ECB. Using estimates of monetary policy reaction functions over the last 20 years before 
the formation of EMU, we derive long-run rules the relate interest rate setting to the expected 
one-year ahead inflation rate and the current output gap. These Taylor rules allow to derive 
long-run target rates which are employed in the simulation of counterfactual interest rate paths 
over the time period January 1999 to December 2004 and then compared to actual short-term 
interest rates in the euro area. It is found that for almost all EMU member countries euro area 
interest rates tend to be below the national target interest rates, even after explicitly 
accounting for a lower real interest rate in the EMU period, with Germany being the only 
exception.  
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1 Introduction 
The creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is the most important event in 
monetary economics in the last decade. It led to at least two potentially important changes 
with respect to the setting of short-term interest rates in the EMU member countries. First, the 
European Central Bank (ECB) bases its monetary policy decisions on aggregate developments 
in the euro area, which may conceal diverse developments at the national level. Second, the 
weights on inflation and output in the ECB Taylor rule may deviate from those that were a 
good description of national interest rates in the pre-EMU phase. The core question of this 
paper is how appropriate the actual ECB interest rate setting is for each of the member 
countries compared to a (hypothetical) situation where national central banks are still 
responsible for monetary policy. This analysis may also yield some insights into the question 
of whether monetary policy can be blamed for the low GDP growth rate in a number of EMU 
member countries, e.g. Germany or Italy.  
 
In this study we interpret short-term interest rates as the prime indicators of monetary policy. 
Estimated monetary policy reaction functions in the form of Taylor rules are often used as 
concise descriptions of the monetary policy stance. They explain how deviations of output 
from potential output and inflation from target affect the level of interest rates. To answer the 
above research question, we compare the actual short-term interest rate path in the euro area 
with simulated interest rate paths for the member countries in a counterfactual scenario.  
 
The analysis should enable us to better understand how appropriate the centrally conducted 
monetary policy is for the respective member countries. If it turned out that the counterfactual 
national interest rate paths were relatively similar to the actual interest rate paths resulting 
from European monetary policy decisions, the cost of EMU from centralising monetary policy 
would be rather small. It would also be difficult to blame the ECB for contributing to the poor   4
growth performance. On the other hand, if we found noteworthy deviations in the interest rate 
paths for at least some economies, this might raise concerns about the net benefits these 
countries can expect from EMU membership.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical approach and some 
specification issues. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results of the Taylor rule 
estimations. In section 4 we compare the money market rate in the euro area with 
counterfactual target rates based on the Taylor rule estimates from the previous section. 
Section 5 summarises the main points and concludes. 
 
2  Empirical Set up and Econometric Methodology  
It has become common to operationalise monetary policy actions by a short-term interest rate. 
This variable is easy to obtain, and setting interest rates is perceived as the common practice 
of central banks (Borio, 1997). John Taylor’s (1993) attempt to describe interest rate setting in 
terms of a monetary policy reaction function has been widely adopted. In such a so-called 
‘Taylor rule’, the short-term nominal interest rate, representing the central bank’s monetary 
policy instrument, responds to deviations of inflation and output from their target levels.  
 
In order to address the questions raised above we estimate Taylor rules for most of the 
member countries of EMU using monthly data from the formation of the European Monetary 
System (EMS) onwards (1979:4 – 1998:12). The central bank’s target level for short-term 
nominal interest rates is modelled as a function of the deviation of current output from its 
trend and of the expected deviation of one year ahead inflation from its (constant) target: 
i
T
t =r*+π*+ β (πt+12 -π*)+γ yt,        (4.1)   5
with: i
T = target nominal interest rate, r* = long-run real interest rate, y = output gap, π = 
inflation rate, π* = target inflation rate, β = inflation weight in the target interest rate, γ = 
output weight in the target interest rate.  
 
The long-run level of the nominal interest rate when inflation is equal to its long-run target 
level and the output gap is zero is given by r*+π*. The constant of the target interest rate is 
given by: 
  α = r* + (1-β) π*.       (4.2)   
with:  α = constant of the target interest rate.  
 
Finally, we allow for interest rate smoothing by including a lagged interest rate term in the 
Taylor rule specification. Castelnuovo (2003) argues that the explicit modelling of a lagged 
interest rate term is preferable to an autoregressive errors specification. In the empirical 
estimations of the Taylor rules, we adopt the forward-looking specification first proposed by 
Clarida et al. (1998), which leads to the following equation:  
 i t = ρ it-1 + (1-ρ) α+ (1-ρ) β πt+12 + (1-ρ) γ yt + εt,     (4.3)   
with:  i = nominal short-term interest rate, ρ = degree of interest rate smoothing, ε = error 
term. 
 
The presence of interest rate smoothing implies that there is partial adjustment of nominal 
interest rates to their target level, with a fraction of 1-ρ of the difference between the target 
rate and last period’s rate being eliminated each period.  
 
A major problem when working with forward-looking and contemporaneous variables is that 
they may be correlated with the error term, leading to biased estimates of the coefficients of 
interest. Therefore, these variables must be instrumented. In addition, the error term may 
experience non-normality, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, causing problems with   6
respect to statistical estimation and inference. It is now common to use the General Method of 
Moments (GMM) estimator, as it accounts for endogeneity biases as well as non-spherical 
errors. However, while the GMM estimator possesses excellent asymptotic properties, it may 
perform poorly in small samples (see the special issue of the Journal of Economics and 
Business Statistics 1996).  
 
A potentially important general estimation problem in this context is the choice of 
instruments. Good instruments are variables that are uncorrelated with the error term and 
highly correlated with the variable that needs to be instrumented. Thus, good instruments 
should on the one hand fulfil the orthogonality conditions between regressors and error term. 
Typically, this assumption is investigated using a test of the validity of over-identifying 
restrictions when there are more instruments than estimated coefficients (Davidson and 
McKinnon, 1993). However, it should be noted that the test of over-identifying restrictions in 
fact tests the joint hypotheses that the instruments are orthogonal to the error term and that the 
estimated model is correctly specified. Moreover, working with time-series data, it is easy to 
find instruments that pass this test. On the other hand, good instruments should be highly 
correlated with the instrumented variable. This aspect is almost never reported or even 
checked in applied empirical work, in spite of the fact that recent research shows that the use 
of weak instruments, i.e. instruments that do not contribute much to explaining the 
instrumented variable, can lead to substantial biases in both estimators and test statistics even 
in large samples (Hahn and Hausman, 2003, Stock et al., 2002). Stock and Yogo (2003) 
propose a test for weak instruments based on the F-test value of the first stage regression in a 
two-stage least squares procedure.  
 
However, one still has to solve the practical problem of choosing among a large number of 
potential instruments the ones that should be included. This instrument selection problem   7
follows Hayo and Hofmann (2006) by applying a recently developed automatic model 
selection algorithm called GETS (see Hendry and Krolzig, 1999). GETS starts from a general 
model and removes redundant instruments. While doing so, it searches all possible paths of 
the testing-down process and reports the most parsimonious model that does not violate a 
reduction test. Thus, the strongest instruments will be selected from a given choice of 
variables and their lags. This does not remove all arbitrariness, as, for instance, the researcher 
still needs to choose the potential instrumental variables and their maximum lag length, but it 
appears to be superior to the ad hoc methods typically employed in empirical research.  
 
3  Empirical Estimation of National Monetary Policy Reaction Functions 
To prepare the ground for the counterfactual simulations, we need to estimate the national 
Taylor rules before the start of EMU. The data utilised in the analysis are: money market rate 
for the interest rate, seasonally adjusted industrial production for output and annualised rate of 
change in the seasonally adjusted CPI for inflation.
1 As instruments, we use up to six lagged 
values of the interest rate, the inflation rate, the output gap, the growth rate of the effective 
real exchange rate, the growth rate of the oil price index in the local currency, and the 
monthly growth rate of narrow money. Following Clarida et al. (1998) the output gap has 
been constructed by taking the residuals of a regression of the industrial production series on a 
constant, a linear trend and a quadratic trend. Table 4.1 summarises the estimation results 
using the general method of moments (GMM). First, we should analyse the adequacy of the 
chosen instruments. As was expected, none of the instrument sets fails the J-test, the p-values 
of which are given in the last columns of Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Applying the weak instrument 
test by Stock and Yogo (2003) indicates that in almost all cases we can reject at a 5% 
significance level the hypothesis that the instrumental variable estimator experiences a 5% 
bias relative to the OLS estimator.   8
Table 1: GMM Estimates of National Monetary Policy Reaction Functions 
 














Austria  0.89** 1.26** 0.31** 2.50** 237  0.46  0.15 
Belgium  0.93** 1.23** 0.21  2.76** 237  1.01  0.51 
Finland  0.97**  1.28*  0.39 3.01 237 0.68  0.90 




0.89** 1.61** 0.31** 3.04*  144  0.59  0.85 
Germany 0.92**  1.25** 0.32**  2.56**  101  0.15  0.83 




0.93**  1.87**  0.25 0.27 144 0.58  0.56 
Netherlands 0.93**  2.99**  0.85*  -0.82  228  0.67  0.76 
Portugal 
 









1.97(*) 2.39  -2.63  144  2.20  0.97 
Spain  0.97** 0.96** 0.19  5.23** 235  1.61  0.93 
ECB 0.85**  1.48(*)  0.60**  0.32  53  0.16  0.06 
 
Notes: (*), *, and ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors for 
coefficient estimates are computed using the procedure by Newey and West (1987). The estimates for the ECB 
 
Exceptions are inflation in Ireland (only rejection of a 20% bias) and the output gap in the 
Netherlands (only rejection of a 10% bias). Testing the bias in the size of the instrumental 
variable tests at a 5% level, we can reject the hypothesis of a 10% bias in most cases. Again   9
there are some problems, this time with inflation and the output gap in Belgium (only 
rejection of a 15% bias), inflation in Ireland (not even rejection of a 25% bias), and the output 
gap in the Netherlands (rejection of a 20% bias). All in all, we should consider the 
instruments to be appropriate for our purposes but have to be aware of potential bias problems 
in instrumental variable estimates of the countries mentioned.  
 
For some countries, plausible estimates over the full sample period could not be found. 
Alternatively, Taylor rules were estimated from January 1987 onwards, omitting the first 
phase of the EMS. In addition, there were missing values for some series, which also led to 
differences in the respective sample sizes. Lagged interest rates turn out to be highly 
significant, indicating that interest rate smoothing is important in all cases of our sample. For 
most countries coefficients on expected inflation greater than unity can be found. The reaction 
function in France estimated over the full sample period is the only instance where we have to 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficient is greater than unity, i.e. the so-called Taylor 
principle is not fulfilled. This principle ensures that real interest rates rise in response to 
increases in inflation. In Portugal the coefficient is not significantly different from zero when 
using the longer sample period. The point estimates of the output gap coefficients are 
generally larger than zero and lower than unity. In half of the cases, however, they are 
statistically not significantly different from zero (Belgium, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). 
For robustness purposes, the Taylor rules were re-estimated after imposing zero restrictions 
on the output gaps where appropriate. It turned out that the resulting paths for the long-term 
target rates were similar to ones based on the unrestricted estimates and thus could be omitted. 
The constant term varies greatly between the countries and it can even take on negative 
values. Note, however, that in a number of cases it is not precisely estimated.  
   10
A number of EMU countries were formerly members of the EMS. Germany was typically 
perceived as performing the role of a nominal anchor and dominating the system (Wyplosz 
,1989; von Hagen and Fratianni, 1990). To account for such an influence, we re-estimate the 
Taylor rules allowing for the German interest rate to enter as an additional exogenous 
regressor. The long-run coefficients are then computed based on the equilibrium condition: it 
= it-1 = it
Germany. It turns out that for some countries it is not possible to derive sensible 
monetary policy reaction functions within such a specification. The cases that yield 
reasonable estimates are summarised in Table 4.2.  
 
It should be noted that the German interest rate is significant in very few countries only, 
namely Austria, Belgium and Ireland.
2 However, the result in Ireland is very much a 
reflection of the interest rate convergence occurring in the period preceding EMU.
3 
Interestingly, the German rate is not significant in the Taylor rule of the Netherlands, which 
kept a fixed rate to the DM since the breakdown of the Bretton-Woods system. Note that this 
is not an issue of collinearity with the lagged interest rate, as the estimated coefficient of this 
variable is virtually the same in the regression with and without the German interest rate.  
   11
Table 2: GMM Estimates of National Monetary Policy Reaction Functions (with German 
interest rate or start of sample in 1987:1) 
 



















Austria 0.63**  1.08*  0.50**  0.28**  3.61*  237  0.43  0.37 
Belgium 0.70**  2.24**  0.11  0.22**  2.56* 236  0.97  0.80 
France 0.93**  0.54** 0.43**  -0.02  5.17**  234  0.65  0.88 




0.93** 1.48**  0.07  -0.05  0.81  144 0.61  0.63 
Netherlands 0.93**  3.89**  -1.03*  0.02  -2.59  228 0.67  0.74 
Spain 0.88**  1.89(*)  0.44  0.07  6.9 234  1.61 0.92 
Notes: (*), *, and ** indicate significance at a 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Standard errors for 
coefficient estimates are computed using the procedure by Newey and West (1987).    
 
In the counterfactual analysis below, the long-run coefficients β, γ, and α will be used to 
derive target interest rates that are interpreted as indicators of how national monetary policy 
would have been pursued if EMU had not come about. However, there is a substantial 
problem related to the constant term in this analysis. The national Taylor rules contain 
constant terms that deviate substantially from the α estimated for the ECB Taylor rule. We 
can derive the implied long-run real interest rate by re-arranging equation (4.2):  
 r*  =  α - (1-β) π*.       (4.4)   
If we assume an inflation goal of 2%, the implied long-run real interest rate recovered from 
the Austrian Taylor rule in Table 4.1 is about 2%. Assuming the same inflation goal for the 
ECB, we get a lower implied long-run real interest rate of 1.28%. This difference in implied 
real interest rates between the two regimes may reflect lower real interest rates under the 
EMU regime due to the process of fiscal consolidation in the 1990s, but probably also due to   12
lower levels of potential real growth in a number of EMU countries. Hence, the constant α 
may also have been lower under a counterfactual national monetary policy regime after 1999. 
For instance, in the case of Austria we get as an adjusted constant term:  
  76 . 0 2 ) 26 . 1 1 ( 28 . 1 ) 1 (
* * = − + = − + = π β α i ECB
adj r    (4.5)  
Note that due to the large standard error of α in the ECB Taylor rule, the implied real interest 
rate is also very imprecisely measured. Furthermore, since there is (almost) a zero probability 
of observing a nominal interest rate very close to the real rate, r* is not on the support of the 
probability distribution. For these reasons it seems advisable to look at the target rates based 
on both the originally estimated constant terms and the adjusted constant terms. It turns out, 
however, that in all cases the target rates based on the non-adjusted constant terms are way 
above the interest rate prevailing in EMU. It is very unlikely that the monetary policy of the 
ECB is too loose for every member of EMU. Therefore, in the following graphical 
comparisons, we show the target rates based on the adjusted constant terms only.  
 
Finally, it should be pointed out that there is likely to be a difference between long-run target 
rates and actual interest rates. For example, Figure 1 shows the target rates for the ECB 
together with the actual money market rate.  
 
Figure 1: ECB Target Rates and EMU Money Market 
Rates 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
2
4
6 EMU Money Market Rate  ECB Target Rate 
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Apparently, the actual interest rates deviate from the estimated Taylor rule, particularly during 
the last part of the sample, where the monetary policy reaction function would recommend 
raising interest rates while the ECB kept rates constant.
4 Hence, the comparison of 
counterfactual interest rate paths and actual EMU interest rates shown in following section 
should be interpreted with caution.  
 
4  Comparing Counterfactual Interest Rate Paths 
This section compares in a counterfactual simulation analysis target rates based on national 
Taylor rules and national variables with the actual money market interest rates in the euro 
area. Actual interest rate paths appear to be more useful for this comparison than ECB target 
rates for two reasons. First, they describe an actual development and not a counterfactual 
scenario. Second, it can be seen from Figure 1 that at the end of the sample period actual rates 
and target rates deviate substantially, which undermines the usefulness of ECB target rates in 
this context. An alternative approach would be to compare dynamic simulations based on the 
national estimated Taylor rules with actual interest rates (see, for example., Hayo and 
Hofmann, 2006). However, simulated interest rate paths tend to become rather implausible 
after only a few interactions. Moreover, a serious dynamic simulation study would need to 
take into account the data generating mechanism of the other variables in the model, in 
particular the output gap and the inflation rate. Finally, there is the issue of comparing the 
significance of target rates using confidence bands. As has been shown in, for example, 
Clausen and Hayo (2004), these tend to be extremely wide and interest rate setting would 
need to be of an extreme nature to violate the 95% bands. Thus, we concentrate on the 
estimated coefficients bearing in mind that these are estimated with considerable uncertainty.  
 
Figure 2 presents the static simulations for Austria based on the estimated target rates. The 
graph suggests that for most of the time in 1999 and 2000, interest rates would have been   14
substantially higher under a continuation of the national monetary policy regime. With the 
exception of the second half of 2002, actual interest rates were very close to the target rates 
for Austria until the end of 2003. From 2004 onwards, interest rates in Austria would have 
risen under the hypothetical monetary policy regime. It is interesting to note that these 
conclusions are quite robust with respect to estimating the Taylor with or without the German 
interest rate.  
 
Figure 2: Austria: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 
 









EMU Money Market Rate 
Target Rate (Adjusted) 





In Figure 3, the simulations for Belgium are presented. The counterfactual target rates indicate 
that the ECB-controlled interest rates were too low for Belgium during the course of 1999 but 
were relatively adequate in 2000. Interest rates should have been lowered much faster during 
2001 than they were by the ECB. In 2002 and the first half of 2003, actual and target rates are   15
pretty close together. From mid-2003 onwards, the counterfactual Belgian central bank would 
have raised interest rates continuously, leading to a considerable gap between actual rates and 
target rates at the end of the sample period. Again, target rates estimated with and without a 
German interest rate are relatively close together most of the time.  
 
Figure 3: Belgium: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 
 
 







EMU Money Market Rate 
Target Rate (Adjusted) 





Figure 4 shows the counterfactual scenario for Finland. Here only the Taylor rule without the 
German interest rate yielded reasonable estimates. The counterfactual target rates indicate that 
over the period from the start of 1999 to the end of 2000 nationally determined interest rates 
would have been much higher than those prevailing in the euro area. In 2001 and 2002, target 
and actual rates are very close, while in 2003 a continuation of the Finnish monetary policy   16
rule would have led to lower rates. For 2004, the simulations suggest that the euro area 
interest rate is relatively adequate for Finland.  
 
Figure 4: Finland: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 
 















The situation in France is described in Figure 5 using three alternative long-run target rates. 
The target rate estimated over the shorter sample period suggests that a somewhat lower rate 
would have come about in 2000 and 2001 but otherwise it is quite close to the other two rates 
that move almost synchronously. The French central bank would have set lower interest rates 
during the first part of 1999 but otherwise would have followed a course similar to that 
pursued by the ECB. However, while interest rates fell in the euro area over the course of   17
2003, in the counterfactual national regime target rates would have remained stable at the 
level reached at the end of 2002.  
 
Figure 5: France: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 
 









EMU Money Market Rate 
Target Rate (Adjusted) 
Target Rate (Sample starts 1987, Adjusted) 




Analysing the results for the simulations in the case of Germany given in Figure 6, we find 
that the Bundesbank would have kept interest rates somewhat higher during 1999 and clearly 
higher over the first half of 2000. The downswing of interest rates in 2001 would have come 
half a year earlier and been much more pronounced in the counterfactual German monetary 
policy regime. Over the second half of 2002 and the first half of 2003 we see a convergence 
of rates, with actual euro area rates falling and German target rates rising. During the course 
of 2004 it is apparent that our counterfactual Bundesbank would have raised rates further, 
while the ECB held rates constant.    18
Figure 6: Germany: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 
 











As can be seen in Figure 7, there is a lot of volatility in the target rates for Ireland. This may 
be due to the fact that the relatively more volatile producer prices are used instead of 
consumer prices. Moreover, in the second half of 2002 target rates become negative, which is 
clearly not plausible. The target rates based on the estimates without the German rate indicate 
that in the counterfactual situation the Irish central bank would have set interest rates much 
higher than euro area rates in 1999. There is some convergence over the course of 2000, 
where on average the euro area rate is only slightly below the target rate. However, euro area 
rates appear to be too high in most of 2001, 2002, and 2003 for Ireland, which seems unlikely. 
The target rates for Ireland based on the estimates including the German interest rate are far 
above the actual money market rates in the euro area over the first two years. In 2001, the 
target rates move closer to the actual euro area rates. In the second half of 2002, the rates even   19
become negative for a few months. This counterfactual scenario suggests that on average the 
euro area rates were quite appropriate for Ireland until the autumn of 2003. At the end of the 
present sample (which stops at the end of 2003 due to limited data availability), the target 
rates are already above the EMU money market rates. All in all it appears to be the case that 
actual rates were below the ones that would have been set under a national monetary policy 
regime in Ireland. 
 
Figure 7: Ireland: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %)  
 






EMU Money Market Rate 
Target Rate (Adjusted) 




Notes: The inflation rate is based on the producer price index. 
 
A similar conclusion but based on more plausible interest rate paths is found for Italy. Figure 
8 shows that under both scenarios the target rates are above the euro area interest rates in the   20
first two years. This conclusion changes in 2001, where at least for the interest rate path based 
on the estimates with the German rate the EMU rates tend to be above what a counterfactual 
Italian central bank would have set. For the target rate derived from the estimations without 
the German rate, the euro area rates appear to be slightly too high in 2001. For the remaining 
years, however, both interest rate scenarios suggest that national rates would have been 
higher, with some convergence on actual money market rates occurring at the end of the 
sample period. The general shape of the EMU interest rate path on the other hand is very 
similar to what is suggested by the target rates.  
 
Figure 8: Italy: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 
 











EMU Market Rate 
Target Rate (German Rate, Adjusted) 





The situation is relatively straightforward in the case of the Netherlands, as can be inferred 
from Figure 9. For the simulations which include the German interest rate, most of the time   21
the euro area rate is quite close to the target rates. The exception is 2001, where a 
counterfactual Dutch central bank would have set a substantially higher interest rate. Since the 
target rate based on estimates without the German interest rate is more volatile and often 
becomes negative in 2003 and 2004 it does not appear to be very plausible.  
 
Figure 9: Netherlands: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 








15.0 EMU Money Market Rate 
Target Rate (German Rate, Adjusted) 




The simulations for Portugal in Figure 10 do not appear to be very plausible, especially in the 
later part of the sample. The rates are systematically above the euro area rate until they 
become negative from 2004 onwards. A look at the data indicates that the substantial drop of 
industrial production in combination with the excessively large coefficient on the output gap 
is responsible for this outcome.    22
Figure 10: Portugal: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 






30 EMU Money Market Rate 
Target Rate (Sample starts 1987, Adjusted) 





Finally, Figure 11 displays the simulated interest rate paths for Spain. The target rates based 
on the estimates without the German interest rate are consistently above the euro area rate 
over the full sample. The alternative target rate indicates that euro area rates are below 
counterfactual Spanish rates in 1999 and the first half of 2000. In the following period until 
the end of 2001, actual interest rates appear to be extremely close to the target rates. In 2002 
the target rates are somewhat higher and the fall in actual rates from 2003 onwards stands in 
contrast to an increase in the target rates, resulting in a notable gap at the end of 2004.  
   23
Figure 11: Spain: Target Rates and Euro Area Money Market Rate (in %) 










11 EMU Money Market Rate 
Target Rate (German Rate, Adjusted) 





Summarising these findings in a more quantitative manner, Table 4.3 shows the difference 
between the euro area interest rate and the respective target rates over countries and years for 
the target rate based on Taylor rule estimates without the German interest rate. Concentrating 
first on the country averages in the last column of the table, we find that in almost all 
countries actual euro area rates are below counterfactual target rates. There is one case where 
interest rates under the ECB regime are higher than under a continuation of its national 
monetary policy regime, namely Germany. This result is particularly affected by the year 
2002, where counterfactual German target rates are more than 2 percentage points above the 
euro area rates. The biggest deviations in absolute values are computed for Portugal, followed 
by the Netherlands and Spain. Note that particularly in the case of the Netherlands, using the 
estimates including the German interest rate would result in lower deviations. Second,   24
analysing the results across years, we give the sum of these deviations over countries in a 
particular year in the second line from the bottom of the table. It becomes apparent that the 
largest deviations occur in the first two years, where euro area interest rates were particularly 
low compared to our estimates of the counterfactual national monetary policy regimes. In 
2001 the average deviations across countries are smaller, in absolute terms, and they are close 
to zero in 2002. In 2004, the deviations turn positive but this is only due to the value for 
Portugal which has already been characterised as not particularly plausible. As indicated 
above, at least in 2003 the estimates for Ireland are also a bit dubious. The sum for every year 
without Ireland and Portugal, given in the last line of the table, yields a similar conclusion for 
the first two years of EMU: euro area rates are lower than what would have been set by 
national central banks on average. The average difference is only slightly negative in 2001, 
2002 and 2003. For 2004, however, we can see that in a number of countries the target rates 
suggest that a tighter monetary policy would have been appropriate. This re-iterates the 
message from comparing ECB target rates and actual money market rates in Figure 1.  
   25
Table 3: Difference between EMU Money Market Rate and Adjusted Target Rates (in 
percentage points) 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 Sum 
Austria -1.2  -1.6  0.1  0.7  -0.5  -1.7  -4.3 
Belgium -1.3  -0.5  1.2 0.3  -1.0  -2.4  -3.8 
Finland -3.5  -3.9  -0.6  0.2  1.3  0.4  -6.0 
France 0.2  0.0  -0.2  -0.5  -1.1  -1.7  -3.2 
Germany -0.2 -0.8 1.3 2.3 -0.2  -1.3  1.1 
Ireland -6.4  -2.9  0.2  6.1  -1.0  n.a.  -4.0 
Italy  -1.9 -1.8 -0.5 -1.3 -1.0  -0.5  -7.0 
Netherlands -3.4  -10.0  -5.4  -1.2  3.6  1.0  -15.4 
Portugal -12.6  -10.8  -12.6  -8.8  -5.3  14.3  -35.7 
Spain  -2.6 -1.8 -0.4 -1.0 -1.8  -2.3  -9.9 




Portugal) -13.9  -20.4 -4.5 -0.5 -0.7 -8.5 
 
 
Note: This compares the simulated interest rate functions without the German rate only.  
 
To get a better understanding of how the differences between the EMU money market rate 
and national target rates are related across time and countries, we make use of a statistical 
clustering method. Using the nearest neighbour technique we perform a hierarchical cluster 
analysis. In a first step, we look for particular clusters among countries over the time period 
(we drop Ireland due to missing observations in 2004). The resulting dendrogram is given in 
Figure 12.  
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Figure 12: Dendrogram of Country Clusters 
 






























Notes: Country codes are: Austria: 1, Belgium: 2, Finland: 3, France: 4, Germany: 5, Italy: 6, 
Netherlands: 7, Portugal: 8, Spain: 9. This compares the simulated interest rate functions 
without the German rate only. 
 
The deviations of target rates from actual interest rates in Austria, Belgium, France, and 
Germany are particularly similar over the time period. Italy and Spain form a relatively close 
cluster. The Netherlands, Finland, and particularly Portugal are the outliers.  
 
Looking for particular clusters with regard to the deviations of adjusted target rates from the 
EMU money market rate among the various years of our sample period, we get the 
dendrogram in Figure 13. The years 1999 and 2001 form a cluster, and 2002 is still quite 
close. 2003 and 2000 are different. The deviations of the adjusted target rates from the EMU 
money market rate are particularly different in 2004 compared to the other years. This is due   27
to the fact that in this year the target rates of many countries tend to be well above the actual 
EMU money market rate.  
 
Figure 13: Dendrogram of Country Clusters 
 






























Notes: Year codes are: 1999: 1, 2000: 2, 2001: 3, 2002: 4, 2003: 5, 2004: 6. This compares the 




In this paper, we ask the question whether interest rate paths in most of the current member 
countries of EMU would have been different if the previous national central banks had not 
given up control over monetary policy. Using estimates of monetary policy reaction functions 
over the last 20 years before the formation of EMU, we derive long-run Taylor rules for 
interest rate setting conditional on the expected one-year ahead inflation rate and the current 
output gap. These Taylor rules are employed in the simulation of counterfactual interest rate 
paths over the time period January 1999 to December 2004, which are then compared to 
actual short-term interest rates in the euro area. This study does not address the question of   28
whether the deviations from the optimal interest rate paths are higher under EMU than they 
were during the respective national regimes.  
 
The estimation of monetary reaction functions follows Clarida et al. (1998), where a single 
equation is estimated using GMM. In contrast to their approach, the present study applies a 
novel way of selecting instruments that avoids weak instrument biases and removes some 
arbitrariness in the selection process. In an alternative specification, the German short-term 
interest rate is also included in the analysis to account for the membership of some countries 
in the EMS. It turns out that the estimations of reaction functions are sometimes not robust or 
even plausible; for instance, the results for Ireland and Portugal raise some questions. 
 
With respect to the core research question, we can summarise the results as follows. Perhaps 
not surprisingly, most countries would have set interest rates differently to what the ECB did 
over sometimes prolonged periods of time. More specifically, ECB interest rates tend to be 
below the national target interest rate even after explicitly accounting for a lower real interest 
rate in the EMU period. This is particularly true for the years 1999 and 2000, while the actual 
euro area rates were more appropriate for most countries in 2001 and 2004, and on average 
very close to the target rates in 2002 and 2003. However, for Germany the sum of actual 
money market interest rates over this five year period is higher than the sum of the 
counterfactual national target rates. Under a counterfactual Bundesbank regime, the interest 
rates would have been below euro area rates in 2001 and especially in 2002. There is a cluster 
of countries that experience relatively similar deviations of national counterfactual target rates 
from actual interest rates, consisting of Austria, Belgium, France, and Germany. Portugal and 
to a lesser extent the Netherlands tend to show a strikingly different pattern in this respect. 
Clustering over years indicates that 2004 is the main outlier, particularly due to a number of   29
national target rates suggesting an increase in interest rates, while euro area rates remain 
unchanged.  
 
To conclude, almost all countries in our counterfactual simulation realise lower nominal 
interest rates by being members of EMU when compared to a continuation of the previous 
national monetary regime. In other words, if EMU had not come about, the respective 
countries would have experienced more restrictive monetary policies than under the ECB 
regime. This gain in terms of lower interest rates is a result of the high credibility imported by 
becoming a member of the ECB. Thus, it seems implausible to explain the rather 
disappointing average GDP growth rates by pointing to excessively high euro area interest 
rates. On the other hand, these results do not answer the question of whether the deviations 
from an optimal interest rate path are now lower than they were under the national regimes.  
 
The only exception is Germany, which may have had to cope with a somewhat higher interest 
rate under the ECB regime compared to a continuation of the former Bundesbank regime. The 
explanation of this outcome is straightforward: German interest rates were already low before 
the creation of EMU but due to a substantial negative output gap in some years it found the 
ECB rates relatively too high. So while it is difficult to argue that the common monetary 
policy was the cause of the dismal growth performance of the German economy, as it 
benefited from relatively lower rates in 1999 and 2000, it may be the case that in some years 
EMU exacerbated the situation to a certain extent. It is important to note that this does not 
prove that Germany is relatively worse off as a member of EMU, as the other countries’ 
interest rate levels would have been higher under a continuation of the former national 
monetary policy regimes. The interest rate impulse generated by joining EMU is likely to 
have affected economic growth positively in these countries. The export-oriented economy of 
Germany would have participated from this relative expansion of the other European   30
economies, which would have helped to stabilise German output. However, within the current 
framework, we cannot analyse the net result of these two diverging effects. Finally, it is 
interesting to note that in 2004 German target rates would have been about one percentage 
point higher than the actual euro area rates. Even given the increase in the euro area money 
market interest rate at the end of 2005 to about 2.5%, this suggests that for the last two years 
the ECB regime has provided an additional stimulus for Germany too.    31
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Notes
 
1 The data source is the International Financial Statistics (online access) published by the 
International Monetary Fund. In the case of Ireland, due to data availability, producer prices 
were used instead of consumer prices. Interest rates were missing in the case of France from 
1986:3 to 1986:6. Values were added based on a linear adjustment between these dates.  
2 Clausen and Hayo (2006) estimate a small-scale macroeconomic model of Germany, France 
and Italy based on quarterly data that allows for a simultaneous influence of the German 
interest rate on the monetary policy reaction functions in the other countries. They find a 
significant impact at the 10% level of the German rate on the dynamic French reaction 
function but no significant effect in Italy.  
3 It may also be the case that the exchange rate plays a much larger role for monetary policy in 
the smaller countries of our sample and thus using a standard Taylor rule is not appropriate.  
4 Note that the estimates for the ECB are taken from Hayo and Hofmann (2006), who use a 
sample from 1999:1 to 2004:5.   